2 Recent contributions include Topalova (2010), Kovak (2013) , Mehta and Hasan (2012) and McCaig (2011). dimensions, including gender and skills, as seen in Table 1 . 3 It is thus important to analyze any differential effects of trade liberalization on specific groups, which is where the contribution of this paper lies.
4
[Insert (Banerjee and Newman, 2004; Kovak, 2013) .
5
Uneven effects of trade liberalization on 3 South Africa's Gini coefficient is 0.69 with income per capita and 0.65 with expenditure per capita (Statistics South Africa, 2014b). 4 Our paper contributes to the growing literature on gendered effects of trade reforms, including Juhn et al. (2013) and Klein et al. (2014) . 5 This result is mainly driven by the assumption of imperfect reallocation of labor across regions, and particularly higher short-run reallocation costs for unskilled workers following trade liberalization. different groups of workers could arise due to their concentration in sectors strongly affected by liberalization, or by intra-sectoral factors such as occupational segmentation or discrimination, or a combination of these.
Our results support the latter set of predictions. We find that trade liberalization in South Africa negatively affected employment of less educated workers, which holds across different groups of race and gender.
Controlling for education, we find that African and female workers were especially vulnerable to job losses. One of the channels of these differential impacts is the pronounced 7 Such an effect has been proposed through a lower discrimination channel (Becker, 1957) , or through technological upgrading and 
II. Data and Results
We use detailed household and labor microdata, matching this to tariff data at the level of 371 districts. The period of analysis, associated lower demand for physical skills (Juhn et al., 2013) . 8 Using scheduled tariff rates, the simple average tariff rate fell from 22% in 1994 to 7.9% in 2004, while tariff collection rates fell from 13.6% to 6.1% over the same period. The coefficient of interest, , represents the average effect of trade protection on district-level employment.
To the extent that is correlated with the initial size of a district's nontraded sector and thus correlated with its initial 10 We also tried specifications with region-year fixed effects to control for any time-varying regional effects that could be correlated with district tariffs, and the results are very similar. employment, the OLS estimates will be biased. We deal with this problem by using _ as an instrument for . The first stage results, omitted here to save space, indicate a strong relationship between the two variables.
11 Table 2 Another key finding from panels B and C of Table 2 is that tariffs consistently affect the employment of uneducated workers more strongly than of educated workers. This is particularly for uneducated female and African workers. Finally, we find that coefficients for overall manufacturing employment are larger than total employment and other industries (results omitted for latter).
This implies that manufacturing jobs were particularly vulnerable to shocks from tariff cuts, and within manufacturing, uneducated female and African workers faced the most significant job losses.
III. Conclusion
This Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-year level. District indicators include log of district's population, percentage of workers in a district employed in manufacturing, employed in agriculture, employed in tradables, finished high school, percentage of Africans in a district, and percentage of workers with trade union membership in a district, and percentage of population living in urban areas of a district. "No high school education" includes workers with less education than a complete high school education and "high school education" indicates workers who have at least completed high school. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
